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Abstract  This  paper  seeks  to  assess  the  nature  of  ﬁnancial  innovations  as  regards  the  economic
stability  throughout  an  institutional  framework  within  the  Schumpeterian  tradition.  While  in  the
Schumpeterian  evolutionary  process  entrepreneurial  innovations  are  assumed  to  lead  the  entire
economy towards  economic  development,  ﬁnancial  innovations  do  not  obviously  generate  the
same positive  outcome  for  economic  evolution.  To  point  to  the  ambiguous  nature  of  ﬁnancial
innovations  the  paper  suggests  a  monetary  interpretation  of  Schumpeterian  capitalist  dynamics
and sheds  light  on  the  role  of  the  institutional  environment  to  ensure  viable  economic  develop-
ment. It  then  argues  that  in  highly  liberalized  environment,  unconstrained  ﬁnancial  dynamics
may lead  to  system-wide  crises  and  make  public  regulatory  schemes  necessary  for  the  sake  of
systemic stability.
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Resumen  Este  documento  trata  de  evaluar  la  naturaleza  de  las  innovaciones  ﬁnancieras,  enPALABRAS  CLAVE
lo que  concierne  a  la  estabilidad  económica  a  través  de  un  marco  institucional  dentro  de  la
ientras  en  el  proceso  evolucionario  de  Schumpeter  se  supone  quetradición de  Schumpeter.  M
Innovaciones
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las innovaciones  emprendedoras  conducen  a  toda  la  economía  hacia  el  desarrollo  económico,  las
innovaciones  ﬁnancieras  no  generan  obviamente  el  mismo  resultado  positivo  para  la  evolución
económica.  Apuntando  a  la  naturaleza  ambigua  de  las  innovaciones  ﬁnancieras,  el  documento
sugiere  una  interpretación  monetaria  de  la  dinámica  capitalista  de  Schumpeter,  arrojando  luz
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sobre  el  papel  del  entorno  institucional,  para  garantizar  el  desarrollo  económico  viable.  A
continuación  argumenta  que  en  un  entorno  altamente  liberalizado,  la  dinámica  ﬁnanciera  sin
limitaciones  puede  originar  crisis  a  nivel  sistémico,  haciendo  de  los  programas  regulatorios
públicos una  necesidad  en  aras  de  la  estabilidad  sistémica.
© 2013  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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ety:  ‘‘The  capitalist  process  not  only  destroys  its  own
institutional  framework  but  it  also  creates  the  conditions  for1. Introduction
Schumpeter  maintains  that  capitalist  development  rests  on
entrepreneurial  innovation-led  real  sectors’  changes.  How-
ever,  he  also  states  that  the  ﬁnancing  of  productive  activities
is  at  the  core  of  the  process  of  development.  Financial
institutions  and  markets  (rules,  regulation,  banks,  ﬁnancial
intermediaries)  and  their  evolution  in  time  should  then  be
studied  as  crucial  concerns  in  the  analysis  of  economic  evo-
lution.
From  this  perspective,  this  paper  presents  an  insti-
tutional  framework  within  the  Schumpeterian  theoretical
tradition  through  an  examination  of  the  role  of  innova-
tions  and  competition  in  banking  and  ﬁnance  and  their
consequences  on  systemic  stability.  Unlike  the  static  neo-
classical  competition  model,  the  Schumpeterian  theory  of
economic  evolution  is  related  to  a  dynamic  competition
where  rivalry  through  innovations  shapes  the  foundations
and  the  existence  of  economic  agents.  But  contrary  to
the  effects  of  Schumpeterian  entrepreneurial  innovations
(assumed  to  feed  an  incessant  creative  destruction  process),
ﬁnancial  innovations  may  generate  a  destructive  creation
process  and  hamper  economic  development.
The  ﬁrst  section  shows  that  the  Schumpeterian  analysis
of  economic  development  is  framed  from  an  institutionalist
perspective  of  endogenous  change  where  ﬁnancing  condi-
tions  of  productive  activities  play  a  crucial  role.  Creative
destruction  comes  into  the  picture  through  entrepreneurial
innovations  whose  impulsion  stems  from  the  rivalry  between
the  existing  structure  (the  ‘‘old’’  things)  and  the  novelty
(the  ‘‘new’’  things).  Thus  the  concept  of  competition  is
a  dynamic  and  active  process  contrary  to  the  textbooks’
perfectly  competitive  markets  adjustment  model.  In  such
a  setting,  the  monetary  character  of  capitalist  economy
is  underlined  and  the  crucial  role  of  bank  credit  in  the
ﬁnancing  of  new  combinations  is  emphasized.  The  second
section  maintains  that  the  evolution  of  money  markets,
though  not  detailed  by  Schumpeter,  seems  to  respond  to  spe-
ciﬁc  competitive  and  regulatory  dynamics,  closely  related
to  institutional  changes  in  ﬁnancial  markets.  However,  spe-
ciﬁc  characteristics  of  capitalist  ﬁnancial  dynamics  make
that  unlike  the  positive  consequences  of  Schumpeterian
entrepreneurial  innovations  on  economic  growth,  liberal-
ized  ﬁnancial  markets  and  subsequent  innovations  may
generate  some  destabilizing  dynamics.  We  then  argue  that
the  creative  destruction  process  may  turn  out  to  be  a
destructive  creation  when  ﬁnancial  innovations  are  not  reg-
ulated  in  a  suitable  way.  The  last  section  presents  some
concluding  remarks.
a
i.  Discontinuous economic change: from
ntrepreneurial dynamics to monetary
conomy
n  the  Schumpeterian  theory  (Schumpeter,  1927,  1928,
934),  economic  evolution  is  a process  of  discontinuous
ndogenous  change  since  it  comes  from  within  --  from
ntrepreneurs’  decisions  and  actions  --  without  any  com-
etitive  market  adjustment  process.  Schumpeter  states
hat  economic  dynamics  lie  in  how  capitalism  creates  and
estroys  the  existing  structures  through  entrepreneurs’
nnovations.  In  this  picture,  there  is  a  strong  relationship
etween  innovation  and  competition.  But  unlike  the  models
f  perfectly  competitive  equilibrium,  the  Schumpeterian
ompetition  is  not  a self-adjustment  mechanism.  This  is  a
ynamic  of  rivalry  in  an  incessant  economic  change  without
ny  central  direction  leading  the  economy  to  a  general  equi-
ibrium.  Such  an  evolutionary  process  is  related  to  a  speciﬁc
nstitutional  structure  of  money  and  ﬁnancial  markets  since
he  behaviour  of  banks  (bank-credit)  and  then  the  ﬁnancing
onditions  of  entrepreneurial  innovations  are  assumed  to  be
ajor  determinants  of  economic  development.
.1.  Institutional  dynamics:  process  of  competition
nd innovation
n  institutional  approach  frames  the  Schumpeterian  ana-
ytical  thought.  In  History  of  Economic  Analysis  (especially
n  the  second  chapter),  Schumpeter  adopts  an  institutional
ision  and  deﬁnes  the  relevant  analysis  as  ‘‘the  study  of
uestions  how  people  behave  at  any  time  and  what  the  eco-
omic  effects  are  they  produce  by  so  behaving’’  (1961:21).
e  stresses  that  the  human  behaviour  includes:  ‘‘not  only
ctions  and  motives  and  propensities  but  also  the  social
nstitutions  that  are  relevant  to  economic  behaviour  such  as
overnment,  property  inheritance,  contract,  and  so  on.  .  .’’
1961:21).
The  analysis  of  economic  change  is  therefore  related
o  the  analysis  of  institutional  change  (Festré  and  Nasica,
009) as  the  economic  structure  as  well  as  innovations
re  constantly  framed  through  the  change  of  institutional
tructure.  Schumpeter  maintains  that  capitalist  evolution
hanges  not  only  the  existing  economic  structure  but  also
nd  more  fundamentally  the  institutional  structure  of  soci-nother’’  (Schumpeter,  1947:162,  1970:114).  This  change
s  a  social  and  historical  process  as  it  ‘‘does  not  emerge
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cing  of  enterprise  by  bank  credit)  (Schumpeter,  1947:167)8  
imply  from  the  preceding  economic  conditions,  but  only
rom  the  preceding  total  situation’’  (Schumpeter,  1934:58).
he  total  situation  is  an  institutional  environment  and  eco-
omic  change  cannot  be  understood  by  means  of  any  analysis
f  the  circular  ﬂow  (Schumpeter,  1934:61).  The  object  of
he  investigation  is  to  know  how  economic  changes  do
ake  place  and  ‘‘to  what  economic  phenomena  do  they
ive  rise?’’  (Schumpeter,  1934:62).  Development  then  relies
n  new  combinations  (new  goods,  methods  of  production,
ew  markets,  new  organization,  etc.)  which  give  rise  to
ntrepreneurial  innovations:  ‘‘What  we,  unscientiﬁcally,
all  economic  progress  means  essentially  putting  productive
esources  to  uses  hitherto  untried  in  practice,  and  with-
rawing  them  from  the  uses  they  have  served  so  far.  That  is
hat  we  call  ‘innovation’’’(Schumpeter,  1928:64).
These  changes  are  endogenous  phenomena  and  bring
evelopment  by  the  own  initiative  of  economic  life,  from
he  decisions  of  economic  agents  and  especially  from
ntrepreneurs,  the  people  who  do  new  things  (Schumpeter,
934:63).  The  capitalist  economy  is:  ‘‘incessantly  being  rev-
lutionized  from  within  by  new  enterprise,  i.e.,  by  the
ntrusion  of  new  commodities  or  new  methods  of  production
r  new  commercial  opportunities  into  the  industrial  struc-
ure  as  it  exists  at  any  moment.  Any  existing  structures  and
ll  the  conditions  of  doing  business  are  always  in  a  process
f  change’’  (Schumpeter,  1947:31).
Contrary  to  standard  neoclassical  growth  models  where
hanges  are  mainly  due  to  external  shocks  (technological
hocks,  demographic  factors,  etc.)1,  for  Schumpeter  the
conomy  develops  under  the  glaring  endogenous  and  non-
inear  novelties  and  leaps:  ‘‘To  many,  it  will  seem  obvious
o  say  that  the  ‘‘in-explicability’’  of  development  sketched
bove  might  perhaps  just  be  an  effect  of  the  imperfect
astering  of  the  facts,  and  that  it  will  disappear  with  its
erfection.  Such  an  interpretation  has  obvious  support,  due
o  the  fact  that  the  better  we  master  a  state  and  the  appre-
ensible  factors  of  change,  the  sooner  we  develop  an  idea  of
hings  to  come.  Unfortunately,  you  do  not  reach  the  essence
f  the  matter  in  this  way.  Even  if  we  were  able  to  sense
o  the  utmost  possible  extent  what  will  happen,  the  triad
‘indeterminacy,  novelty,  leap’’  remains  unconquerable  all
he  same.  Both  from  a  rational  and  a  scientiﬁc  perspec-
ive,  this  holds  true  even  when  we  can  sympathize  with  the
ctor,  or  reconstruct  feelings,  and  put  ourselves  into  the
hoes  of  an  actor.  Based  on  a  rational  science  standpoint,
ou  might  have  the  idea  to  remedy  the  situation  by  relegat-
ng  the  subject  of  the  leap  to  the  external  interferences.
ou  would  then  have  formally  cleaned  up  your  own  domain,
hatever  that  might  be,  from  the  thing  that  cannot  be  mas-
ered.  However,  the  problem  would  show  up  again  at  the
lace  where  the  element  in  question  has  been  relegated
o’’  (Schumpeter,  1932:117).
These  non-linear  novelties  and  leaps  generate  a  process
f  destruction  that  comes  from  entrepreneurial  innovations.
1 In contemporaneous endogenous growth models, growth is
ssumed to be related to endogenous factors. But these models usu-
lly state speciﬁc hypotheses leading to static general equilibrium
nd do not take into account uncertainty and endogenous instabil-
ty concerns in a decentralized market economy (see Aghion and
owitt, 1997 for a comprehensive presentation of those models).
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uch  a  process  is  creative  as  the  capitalist  engine  is
n  engine  of  mass  production  which  unavoidably  means
lso  production  for  the  masses  such  that:  ‘‘Queen  Eliza-
eth  owned  silk  stockings.  The  capitalist  achievement  does
ot  typically  consist  in  providing  more  silk  stockings  for
ueens  but  in  bringing  them  within  the  reach  of  factory
irls  in  return  for  steadily  decreasing  amounts  of  effort’’
Schumpeter,  1947:67).
Here  the  positive  effects  of  (technological)  innovations
or  the  entire  society  are  brought  to  the  fore  as  an  outcome
f  capitalist  productive  dynamics.  But  this  latter  is  before
ll  a  process  of  change  which  cannot  be  studied  in  terms  of
teady-state  equilibrium:  ‘‘In  appraising  the  performance
f  competitive  enterprise,  the  question  whether  it  would
r  would  not  tend  to  maximize  production  in  a  perfectly
quilibrated  stationary  condition  of  the  economic  process  is
ence  almost,  through  not  quite,  irrelevant’’  (Schumpeter,
947:77,  n.5).  Schumpeter  then  remarks  that  capitalism  is
ot  a  perfectly  competitive  market  adjustment  process:  ‘‘in
apitalist  reality  as  distinguished  from  its  textbook  picture,
t  is  not  that  kind  of  competition  which  counts  but  the  com-
etition  (.  . .) which  commands  a  decisive  cost  or  quality
dvantage  and  which  strikes  not  at  the  margin  of  the  proﬁts
nd  the  outputs  of  the  existing  ﬁrms  but  at  their  foundations
nd  their  very  lives’’  (Schumpeter,  1947:84).
Thus  the  capitalist  evolution  is  a  predatory,  cutthroat
ompetition2 that  also  includes  struggles  for  control  in  the
nancial  sphere  (Schumpeter,  1947:80).  Such  a  process  goes
hrough  entrepreneurs’  innovations  that  create  a  motion
hich  incessantly  destroys  the  old  structures  and  creates
ew  ones.  That  is  the  creative  destruction  process  which  is
he  essential  fact  about  capitalism’’  (Schumpeter,  1947:83).
n  this  picture,  the  competition  is  a  source  of  change  through
nnovations  that  reshape  existing  structures  such  as  positions
f  agents  cannot  rest  on  a  pillow  of  previous  situation.  The
chumpeterian  competition  is  the  dynamic  of  a decentral-
zed  and  private  economy  under  the  constraint  that  there
s  no  planned-collective  direction  which  would  be  given
n  the  aim  of  reaching  a  general  equilibrium  state.  This
s  the  dynamic  of  rivalry  in  an  incessant  change  process
hich  destroys  ‘‘pyramids  sooner  or  later’’  (Schumpeter,
947:85) and  any  concept  of  competition  which  neglects  this
ssential  element  is  ‘‘like  Hamlet  without  Danish  prince’’
Schumpeter,  1947:86).
However,  Schumpeter  argues  that  parallel  to  its  basic
nstitutional  characteristics  (e.g.  private  property  in  means
f  production  and  regulation  of  the  productive  process  by
rivate  contract),  capitalism  has  developed  a  crucial  device
eading  to  expansive  accumulation  process.  This  device  is
he  credit  system,  based  on  credit  creation  process  (ﬁnan-hat  is  an  essential  part  of  capitalist  economy  without
hich  ‘‘the  rest  cannot  be  understood  at  all’’  (Schumpeter,
2 While Schumpeter maintains that ‘‘Innovation in competitive
apitalism is typically embodied in the foundation of new ﬁrms
. . .)’’ (Schumpeter, 1928:70), he also remarks that ‘‘All this is dif-
erent in ‘‘trustiﬁed’’ capitalism. Innovation is, in this case, not
ny more embodied typically in new ﬁrms, but goes on, within the
ig units now existing, largely independently of individual persons’’
Schumpeter, 1928). See also Schumpeter (1947).
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1961:318).  The  monetary  system’s  modus  operandi  is  then
the  ﬁrst  step  of  all  economic  propositions:  ‘‘capitalism  is
that  form  of  private  property  economy  in  which  innovations
are  carried  out  by  means  of  borrowed  money,  which  in  gen-
eral  (.  .  .) implies  credit  creation’’  (Schumpeter,  1939:223).
As  Marget  (1951)  emphasizes  it,  the  working  of  monetary
institutions  affects  the  magnitude  and  direction  of  money
ﬂows  and,  as  the  economic  life  is  a  system  of  ﬂows  of  mon-
etary  expenditures,  economic  change  is  closely  related  to
monetary  changes.
2.2.  A  credit  economy  and  the  money  market
Following  Schumpeter  and  some  Schumpeterian  analytical
premises  (Marget,  1951;  Schneider,  1991;  Messori,  1998) it
seems  to  be  possible  to  point  out  some  monetary  charac-
teristics  of  a  capitalist  economy.  Schumpeter  (1939:548)
stresses  that:  ‘‘Economic  action  cannot  (.  .  .) be  explained
without  taking  account  of  money’’.  The  explanation  of
this  proposition  relies  on  the  fact  that  to  become  an
entrepreneur,  an  individual  needs  credit,  he  must  borrow
from  banks.  Then,  what  the  entrepreneur  ﬁrst  wants  is
credit:’’  (.  .  .) the  entrepreneur  --  in  principle  and  as  a  rule  --
does  need  credit,  in  the  sense  of  a  temporary  transfer  to  him
of  purchasing  power,  in  order  to  produce  at  all,  to  be  able  to
carry  out  his  new  combinations,  to  become  an  entrepreneur.
And  this  purchasing  power  does  not  ﬂow  towards  him  auto-
matically,  as  to  the  producer  in  the  circular  ﬂow,  by  the  sale
of  what  he  produced  in  preceding  periods.  If  he  does  not
happen  to  possess  it  --  and  if  he  did  then  it  would  simply  be
the  consequence  of  former  development  --  he  must  borrow
it.  (.  .  .). He  becomes  a  debtor  in  consequence  of  the  logic
of  the  process  of  development.’’  (Schumpeter,  1934:102).
Thus  the  capitalist  development  is  impossible  without
credit:  ‘‘the  structure  of  modern  industry  could  not  have
been  erected  without  it,  that  it  makes  the  individual  to  a
certain  extent  independent  of  inherited  possessions,  that
talent  in  economic  life  rides  to  success  on  its  debts  (.  .  .)’’
(Schumpeter,  1934:70).  The  development  process  of  capital-
ism  is  strongly  dependent  on  credit-money  because  contrary
to  the  normal  circular  ﬂow  within  accustomed  channels
(where  one  can  observe  the  current  credit  (Schumpeter,
1934:103  and  105),  credit-money  enables  entrepreneurs  to
force  the  economic  system  into  new  channels  (Schumpeter,
1934:106)  since:  ‘‘the  capitalist  credit  system  has  grown
out  of  and  thrived  on  the  ﬁnancing  of  new  combinations
in  all  countries  (.  . .)’’  (Schumpeter,  1934:70).  The  means
of  payment  created  by  the  act  of  giving  credit  allow  those
who  carry  out  new  combinations  to  access  to  the  existing
stock  of  productive  means,  enabling  them  to  buy  produc-
tive  assets.  The  deﬁnition  of  capital  follows  this  monetary
vision  of  the  economy:  ‘‘Capital  is  neither  the  whole  nor  a
part  of  the  means  of  production-original  or  produced.  Nor  is
capital  a  stock  of  consumption  goods.  It  is  a  special  agent’’
(Schumpeter,  1934:123).  Schumpeter  makes  the  same  asser-
tion  in  his  Business  Cycles  (1939:129).  This  ‘‘special-new
agent’’  is  related  to  a  third  market  that  the  businessman
calls  the  ‘money  market’.  Schumpeterian  entrepreneurs,
initiators  of  the  development  process,  have  to  be  ﬁnanced
by  banks.  In  the  ﬁnal  phase  entrepreneurial  activities  which
could  be  ﬁnanced  are  determined  in  money  markets.  The
f
t
tnalist  perspective  49
ffectiveness  of  entrepreneurial  plans  depends  on  banks’
illingness  to  grant  credit:  ‘‘The  money  market  is  always,
s  it  were,  the  headquarters  of  the  capitalist  system,  from
hich  orders  go  out  to  its  individual  divisions,  and  that  which
s  debated  and  decided  there  is  always  in  essence  the  set-
lement  of  plans  for  further  development’’  (Schumpeter,
934:126).
Such  an  assertion  obviously  rests  on  an  endogenous
redit-money  approach  that  Schumpeter  (1961)  calls  the
‘Monetary  approach’’,  opposite  to  the  ‘‘Real  approach’’.
n  this  framework,  savings  do  not  ﬁnance  entrepreneurs’
ctivities  because  they  come  into  the  picture  after  the  ﬁnan-
ing  of  entrepreneurs  which  makes  them  able  to  acquire
roduction  factors  and  distribute  revenues  in  the  econ-
my.  The  credit  structure  projects  beyond  the  existing
ealth  basis,  it  ‘‘creates  claims  to  the  social  product’’
Schumpeter,  1934:101)  as  the  gap  between  products  and
eans  of  production  is  bridged  by  the  credit  structure  that
laces  purchasing  power  created  ad  hoc  at  the  disposal  of
ntrepreneurs  (Schumpeter,  1934:107).  Then  Schumpeter
rmly  asserts  that:  ‘‘As,  however,  innovation,  being  discon-
inuous  and  involving  considerable  change  (.  .  .), requires
arge  expenditure  previous  to  the  emergence  of  any  rev-
nue,  credit  becomes  an  essential  element  of  the  process.
nd  we  cannot  turn  to  savings  in  order  to  account  for  the
xistence  of  a  fund  from  which  these  credits  are  to  ﬂow.  For
his  would  imply  the  existence  of  previous  proﬁts,  without
hich  there  would  not  be  anything  like  the  required  amount
- even  as  it  is,  savings  usually  lag  behind  requirements  --
nd  assuming  previous  proﬁts  would  mean,  in  an  explanation
f  principles,  circular  reasoning.  ‘‘Credit  creation’’,  there-
ore,  becomes  an  essential  part  both  of  the  mechanism  of
he  process  and  of  the  theory  explaining  it’’  (1928:67).
Therefore,  contrary  to  the  assumptions  of  ‘‘modern’’
orks  on  the  links  between  ﬁnance  and  (endogenous)  growth
(King  and  Levine,  1993;  Levine,  2004,  to  quote  but  a
ew),  Schumpeterian  vision  does  not  deal  with  money  and
nance  as  a  problem  of  efﬁciency  of  the  use  of  loan-
ble  funds  (Ülgen,  2013a).  The  key  role  banks  play  in
apitalist  evolution  is  the  ﬁnancing  of  productive  activi-
ies  through  credit-money  creation.  In  this  role  banks  are
he  ephor  of  the  economic  development  as  they  create
oney  in  order  to  ﬁnance  the  entrepreneurial  innovative
rojects  which  cannot  be  satisﬁed  by  existing  savings.  While
chumpeterian  economic  development  is  usually  related  to
ndustrial  entrepreneurs’  innovative  activity,  Schumpeter
1934)  points  out  the  crucial  role  of  banks  in  capitalist  econ-
my  as  he  states  that  banks  make  possible  the  carrying  out  of
ew  combinations  by  authorizing  entrepreneurs  in  the  name
f  society  to  implement  innovations.  Credit-money  is  cre-
ted  by  banks  to  ﬁnance  entrepreneurial  proﬁt  expectations
nd  then  supports  the  growth  process.  Banking  system  pro-
ides  means  required  to  lead  economic  development  to  go
eyond  the  static  circuit.  Through  credit,  entrepreneurs  are
iven  access  to  the  social  stream  of  goods  before  they  have
cquired  the  normal  claim  to  it.  The  credit  structure  extends
ot  only  beyond  the  existing  money  basis,  but  also  beyond
he  existing  commodity  basis:  ‘‘Detaching  productive  means
rom  their  circular  ﬂow  and  allocating  them  to  new  combina-
ions  is  possible  by  credit  creation’’  (Schumpeter,  1934:71).
In  a  capitalist  economy,  economic  development  is  related
o  money  markets  and  especially  to  banks.  When  the  ﬁnance
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equired  for  further  production  or  investment  expenditures
s  not  granted  by  banks,  entrepreneurs  cannot  undertake
heir  projects  (Ülgen,  2007).  By  allowing  or  rationing  credit,
anks  affect  economic  development  positively  or  nega-
ively.  As  (Belloﬁore,  1991:381)  emphasized:  ‘‘the  credit
emand  for  ﬁnance  does  not  come  after,  but  before,
ntrepreneurial  gains.  In  Wicksell  credit  supply  satisﬁes
ach  entrepreneurial  demand,  whereas  in  Schumpeter  banks
ation  credit  and  have  a  positively  supply  curve’’.  What
ould  therefore  the  effects  of  bank  and  ﬁnancial  innovations
e  on  entrepreneurial  innovation-led  creative  destruction?
. Schumpeterian competition and ﬁnancial
nnovations: is this a creative change process?
chumpeter  (1934,  1970)  asserts  that  banks  and  ﬁnance  are
lways  at  the  core  of  capitalist  economy’s  innovation  dynam-
cs.  But  he  does  not  really  study  ﬁnancial  innovations  in
is  theoretical  framework.  However,  it  seems  to  be  suit-
ble  to  develop  the  scope  of  the  Schumpeterian  analysis
n  order  to  point  out  that  when  ﬁnancial  dynamics  develop
n  a  regulation-free  environment,  ﬁnancial  innovations  may
enerate  a  process  of  destructive  creation  and  require  a
ew  institutional  organization  of  banks  and  ﬁnancial  mar-
ets  to  tackle  with  the  endogenous  instability  of  capitalism.
rom  this  perspective,  Minsky’s  capitalist  instability  analy-
is  offers  a  relevant  way  of  exploring  and  understanding  the
rocess  of  ﬁnancialization  and  its  impacts  on  the  economy
nd  analyzing  possible  policy  alternatives  for  a  sustainable
nancial  system  (Whalen,  2009).
.1.  Unproductive  innovations  and  instability
umerous  works  show  that  in  highly  liberalized  envi-
onment,  unfettered  and  unhealthy  bank  and  ﬁnancial
ompetition  may  lead  to  innovations  resting  on  exces-
ive  risk  taking  and  then  feeding  ﬁnancial  fragility
Hellman  et  al.,  2000;  Burlamaqui  and  Kregel,  2005).
iberal/deregulated  environment  generates  speciﬁc  institu-
ional  and  competitive  pressures  that  (ill)shape  behaviour  of
anks  and  ﬁnancial  intermediaries  (through  their  innovation
trategies)  and  thus  (ill)affect  the  mechanisms  of  ﬁnancing
f  productive  entrepreneurial  activities  which  in  turn  shape
he  path  of  economic  development.
Financial  innovations  actually  develop  under  two  kinds  of
ressure.  First,  banks  innovate  in  response  to  authorities’
egulatory  constraints.  Second,  they  also  innovate  in  order
o  prevent  competition  from  other  ﬁnancial  intermediaries
hat  are  brought  into  the  markets  thanks  to  ﬁnancial  lib-
ralization  policies.  Financial  liberalization  increases  bank
ompetition  and  leads  ﬁnancial  institutions  to  innovate  in
rder  to  defend  their  market  shares  or  to  enter  new  markets.
n  a  given  institutional  environment, banks  combine  these
wo  phenomena  and  create  new  ﬁnancial  products  and  pro-
esses.  To  the  extent  that  regulatory/technological  barriers
mong  different  actors3,  markets  and  national  economies
umble,  ﬁnancial  innovations  proliferate.  This  process  feeds
n  unprecedented  expansion  of  ﬁnancial  markets  through
3 Banks, intermediaries, insurance companies, etc.
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ew  mechanisms  and  products  resulting  in  higher  quantita-
ive  efﬁciency  of  ﬁnancial  relations  both  in  terms  of  variety
nd  time-saving  at  national  and  international  levels.  Conse-
uently,  numerous  hedge  instruments/ﬁnancial  derivatives
re  generated  in  order  to  allow  banks  to  cover  positions
gainst  various  risks.  These  new  instruments  and  techniques
lso  permit  agents  to  transform  different  risks  into  new
nancial  positions  that  are  ‘‘structured’’  in  order  to  reduce
ndividual  risks  that  stem,  in  turn,  from  new  ﬁnancial  prod-
cts.  The  use  of  bank  standby  letters  of  credit  enhances  the
egotiability  of  debt  instruments  issued  by  nonbanks.  In  this
‘off-balance  sheet  banking’’,  activities  involve  commit-
ents  which  are  not  normally  included  as  assets  or  liabilities
nder  conventional  procedures.  Therefore,  such  innovative
ractices  increase  risks  that  banks  assume  in  pursuit  of
igher  returns.
It is  worth  noting  that  ﬁnancial  innovations  are  not  nec-
ssarily  related  to  the  creation  of  new  productive  value.
hey  are  related,  before  all,  to  the  desire  of  increasing
he  speed  and  scope  of  speculative  returns;  e.g.  short-term
nd  short-sighted  proﬁt  operations.  In  this  respect,  ﬁnancial
nnovations  appear  to  be  a special  kind  of  innovation  differ-
nt  from  Schumpeterian  entrepreneurial  innovations  in  their
ogic  as  well  as  in  their  potential  consequences  on  economic
evelopment.  In  a  ﬁnancially  liberalized  environment,  spec-
lative  proﬁt-seeking  expectations  are  fuelled  through  new
pportunities  and  lead  banks  to  support  speciﬁc  operations
uch  as  LBOs  and  real  estate-backed  assets.  Such  a  strategy
ives  more  conﬁdence  to  lenders  who  take  much  riskier  pos-
tions  and  accept  low-yield  assets  while  borrowers  ﬁnance
ew  acquisitions  by  issuing  new  liabilities  on  highly  open  pos-
tions.  This  evolution  relies  on  optimistic  expectations  based
n  the  observation  of  speculative  proﬁts  easily  made.  It  then
ecomes  the  rule  commonly  accepted  by  market  actors  and
rames  rational  standard  behaviour  and  beliefs.  Instead  of
uestioning  the  relevance  of  highly  speculative  opportunis-
ic  short-term  choices,  market  actors  consider  that  ‘‘the
ance’’  can  continue  without  systemic  concern.  The  result-
ng  convention  determines  rational  behaviour  assumed  to
e  efﬁcient  at  the  micro-level:  ‘‘The  factors  that  impede
uch  transformation  are  numerous  (.  .  .). In  the  ﬁrst  place
orals  in  the  ﬁeld  of  ﬁnance  have  been  too  frequently
etermined  by  that  actually  prevails  in  practice.  Once  the
radition  becomes  established,  lawyers,  bankers,  accoun-
ants  tend  to  bow  to  it  without  question  or  hesitancy.  It
ecomes  the  proper  thing  to  do  because  it  has  always  been
one  or  because  every  one  else  is  doing  it.  The  conventions
f  the  various  professions  are  too  often  accepted  without
nquiry  as  to  their  social  or  economic  consequences.  The
ccepted  way  of  doing  things  becomes  the  proper  way  of
oing  them.  The  ethics  of  the  situation  are  subtly  adjusted
o  conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  tradition.  These  tra-
itions  are  chains  which  bind  fast  these  professions  to  the
ncient  order  of  ﬁnance.  They  constitute  one  of  the  most
otent  imponderables  which  promises  to  delay  the  advent
f  any  new  era  either  in  practices  or  in  ethics’’  (Douglas,
936).
In  this  context,  self-regulation  is  viewed  as  the  suitable
ay  of  ensuring  the  macro-efﬁciency  of  markets.  However,
t  appears  that  whatever  the  supervision  mechanisms  imple-
ented  by  public  authorities  over  micro-decision  units,  in
 micro-prudential  schema  the  incentives  fail  to  prevent
utio
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short-sighted  individual  behaviour  which  often  develops
macular  degeneration  reﬂecting  the  very  limited  horizon  of
decentralized  private  expectations  and  subsequent  actions.
This  macular  degeneration  is  permitted  by  new  speculation-
oriented  ﬁnancial  products  and  processes  that  support  a  new
regime  of  (ﬁnancial)  accumulation  based  on  the  expected
price  rise  of  assets  and  transform  the  ﬁnancing  relations
into  Ponzi  schemes  à  la  Minsky  (Ülgen,  2013b).  According
to  this  schema,  in  the  period  before  the  2007/08  crisis,
the  economy  turns  out  to  a  bubble  environment  based
on  real-estate-related  debt  leveraging  in  search  of  capital
gains  (Hudson,  2010).  The  regime  of  accumulation  therefore
moves  towards  more  speculative  opportunities  encouraged
by  short-term  criteria  and  ﬁnancial  operations.  From  this
perspective,  innovation  dynamics  of  ﬁnancialized  capitalism
rest  on  securitization  which  is  a  characteristic  of  advanced
ﬁnancial  systems.  In  developed  ﬁnancial  markets  banks  inno-
vate  in  products  as  well  as  in  process  through  securitization
creating  ﬁnancial  papers  to  structure  credits  previously
granted.  These  securities  are  sold  as  sound  investment  vehi-
cles,  highly  rated  by  private  rating  agencies.  Therefore
investment  funds  can  use  these  securities  as  collateral  for
new  leveraged  loans  that  are  also  connected  to  short-term
asset-backed  commercial  papers  and  then  provoke  strong
interconnections  between  complex  products  and  market
players  whose  sustainability  depends  on  short-sighted  frag-
ile  and  decentralized  microeconomic  decisions  in  markets.
Risk-covering  tools  rest  more  and  more  on  systematically
riskier  instruments.  Individuals  try  rationally  to  cover  them-
selves  at  micro-level  whereas  risks  augment  incessantly  at
macro-level.
Contrary  to  the  liberal  approach  (see,  for  instance,
Kaminsky  and  Schmukler,  2003)  which  asserts  that  ﬁnancial
liberalization  and  subsequent  innovations  must  improve  the
efﬁciency  of  the  working  of  ﬁnancial  markets  by  reducing
risks  and  canalizing  savings  towards  ‘‘socially’’  proﬁtable
investments,  the  boom  ﬁnanced  by  the  speculative  euphoria
in  the  2000s  generates  pervasive  transformations  in  port-
folios  the  liquidity  level  of  which  decreases.  This  gives
rise  again  to  endogenous  ﬁnancial  instability  studied  by
Minsky:  ‘‘The  growth  in  the  money  market  mutuals  in
the  1980’s  led  to  a  large  demand  for  short  term  mar-
ketable  corporate  liabilities.  The  combined  effect  of  these
two  developments  was  the  growth  in  speculative  ﬁnan-
cing.  Leveraged  buy-outs  often  included  ‘‘payment  in  kind’’
bonds,  i.e.  the  capitalization  of  interest  (Ponzi  ﬁnance)’’
(Minsky,  1992:19).
The  rise  of  reckless  ﬁnance  and  speculative  excess  may
then  generate  a  Schumpeterian  cycle  (Otter  and  Siemon,
2010)  that  threatens  the  stability  of  the  entire  economy.  The
coming  up  of  this  cycle  is  a  result  of  the  rise  of  speculative
positions  (‘‘the  great  wave  of  mere  speculative  punting’’,
Schumpeter,  1927:41--42)  that  stops  the  development:  ‘‘A
considerable  part  of  current  and  investment  operations  will
show  loss  as  soon  as  prices  fall,  as  they  will  by  virtue  of  the
primary  process.  Part  of  the  debt  structure  will  crumble.
(.  .  .) Freezing  of  credits,  shrinkage  of  deposits,  and  all  the
rest  follow  in  due  course’’  (Schumpeter,  1939:148).To  deal  with  such  a  situation  when  ﬁnancial  innovations
enter  into  a  process  of  destructive  creation,  the  Schum-
peterian  economics  points  to  stronger  public  regulation  of
ﬁnancial  markets.
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.2.  Financialized  economy  and  public  regulation
inancial  liberalization  is  obviously  related  to  a  speciﬁc
nstitutional  environment  which  is  supported  by  the  belief
hat  liberalized  and  open  markets  are  more  prone  to  efﬁ-
ient  innovations  and  able  to  self-adjust  without  strong
ublic  regulatory  constraints.  This  belief  let  private  control
echanisms  and  banks  to  assess  and  to  manage  themselves
arious  risks  that  actors  and  markets  may  generate.  It  is
hen  assumed  that  free  ﬁnancial  markets  could  minimize  the
ossibility  of  ﬁnancial  crises  and  the  need  for  government
ailouts.  More  decentralized  and  private  control  practices
micro-prudential  mechanisms)  replace  macro-prudential
ublic  supervision  rules.  The  light-touch  regulation  of  ﬁnan-
ial  institutions  and  markets  allows  banks  to  manage  their
isks  through  their  own  internal  (IRBs,  Internal  rating  based)
odels  and  through  ratings  (rating  agencies)  they  purchase
n  the  securities  they  issue.  Numerous  ‘‘pro-liberal’’  works
Van  Hoose,  2010, to  quote  but  a  few)  present  some  pit-
alls  of  highly  regulated  banking  systems  and  argue  that  tight
egulatory  policies  are  negatively  associated  with  bank  sta-
ility.  This  theoretical  and  policy  perspective  is  at  the  core
f  deregulatory  policies  that  have  been  implemented  since
he  late  1970s.
This  evolution  characterizes  decentralized  decision  pro-
ess  and  makes  that  capitalist  economy’s  evolution  as  well
s  its  ﬁnancial  stability  do  not  rely  on  planned  and  system-
ide  consistent  behaviour  of  private  individuals.  In  such
 world  some  ﬁnance-speciﬁc  factors  must  be  underlined.
inancial  innovations  which  lead  individuals  to  diversify  risks
enerate  macroeconomic  interdependencies  among  institu-
ions.  They  obviously  change  economic  conditions  as  much
s  entrepreneurial  innovations.  Most  of  the  recent  mone-
ary  and  ﬁnancial  innovations  seem  to  increase  the  elasticity
f  ﬁnance.  They  affect  the  functioning  of  economic  engine
ecause  they  modify  the  monetary  and  ﬁnancial  conditions
n  which  the  whole  economic  structure  is  founded.  How-
ver,  in  view  of  the  current  ﬁnancial  disequilibria  faced  by
umerous  economies  in  the  world,  such  ﬁnancial  innovation
ynamics  present  a  real  challenge  to  the  systemic  stability.
In  such  a  context,  actors  and  markets,  and  especially
anks,  adopt  fragile  strategies.  In  expansionary  periods,
hile  cumulated  disequilibria  grow,  the  desire  to  prolong
he  boom  and  to  make  further  proﬁts  generate  inconsis-
ent  behaviour  such  that  private  actors  eschew  prudential
ehaviour  and  prefer  to  continue  to  engage  themselves
n  likely-proﬁtable  positions.  However,  the  very  nature  of
arket’s  logic  rests  on  herd  behaviour  of  individuals  and
nstitutions.  In  his  analysis  of  the  1929  crisis,  Schumpeter
bserves  the  same  type  of  phenomenon:  ‘‘Since  stock  prices
ave  more  degrees  of  freedom  than  other  prices  have,  and
ince  ﬁnancial  groups  --  pools  and  others  --  confront  a  pub-
ic  very  much  more  excitable  and  very  much  less  intelligent
han  the  constituent  individuals  are  in  their  ordinary  busi-
ess  pursuits,  it  is  tempting  to  stress  mere  mass  psychology,
n  the  one  hand,  and  mere  abundance  or  scarcity  of  funds,
n  the  other’’  (1939:682--683).
The  micro-rationality  implies  immediate  exit  from  mar-
ets  in  case  of  bad  news  and  sudden  reversal  (when  some
nstitutions  are  expected  to  default  on  payments)  and  then
ay  provoke  a  race  to  withdrawal  of  lenders.  Furthermore,
nder  the  hypothesis  of  herd  behaviour,  economic  agents
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sually  follow  similar  strategies  on  markets.  During  boom
eriods,  individuals  and  institutions  enter  into  increasingly
isky  operations  while  the  stop  of  optimistic  expectations
ushes  agents  to  adopt  defensive  strategies  and  exit  ﬁnan-
ial  circuits.  In  the  ﬁrst  case,  bubbles  are  fuelled  without
recaution,  and  speculation  gains  strength.  In  the  second
ase,  illiquidity  comes  into  the  picture  and  is  often  trans-
ormed  into  the  insolvency  even  for  large  banks.  Then  the
eynesian  liquidity  preference  dominates  money  markets  as
 sign  of  depression.  In  such  a  depressive  situation  the  only
ay  to  stop  the  systemic  disintegration  seems  to  be  the
ublic  intervention  (Schumpeter,  1947:395).
The  core  problem  is  that  in  a  ﬁnancially  liberalized
apitalist  economy,  ﬁnancial  innovations  mainly  rely  on
peculative  short-term  proﬁt  opportunities  and  provoke  a
apid  expansion  of  ﬁnancial  operations  and  markets  that  are
issociated  from  the  ﬁnancial  needs  of  long-term  produc-
ive  activities.  From  this  perspective,  Minsky’s  analysis  of
nancial  instability  of  capitalism  can  be  considered  as  a  con-
istent  way  of  developing  Schumpeterian  theses  on  capitalist
volution.  Minsky  (1992)  maintains  that  the  development  of
ound  ﬁnancial  systems  is  the  key  issue  to  be  studied  in  a
chumpeterian  framework.  Giving  the  central  role  of  money
arkets  in  economic  development  and  following  Schum-
eter,  who  remarked  that:  ‘‘This  inability  of  capitalism  to
olice  itself  is  as  striking  as  its  inability  to  protect  itself  (.  . .)
ut  it  is  largely  this  inability  that  produces  crises  as  distin-
uished  from  mere  depressions’’  (Schumpeter,  1939:660),
insky  (1986)  states  that  it  would  be  possible  to  stabilize  the
nstable  capitalist  economy  if  consistent  regulatory  rules
re  implemented  in  ﬁnancial  markets.
Almost  eighty  years  ago,  Schumpeter  maintained  that  a
olicing  power  is  required  to  deal  with  reckless  banking,
peculative  excesses,  and  fraudulent  or  irresponsible  busi-
ess  activity.  Schumpeter  stated  that  the  recovery  after
he  crisis  of  the  1930s  has  been  substantially  facilitated  by
he  Banking  Act  of  June  16,  1933,  which  introduced  impor-
ant  reforms:  ‘‘The  most  important  refers  to  strengthening
he  Federal  Reserve  System’s  power  over  members,  par-
icularly  with  a  view  to  regulating  extension  of  credit  for
peculative  purposes;  to  holding  company  and  securities
fﬁliates;  to  stricter  centralization  of  open-market  oper-
tions;  to  branch  banking,  and  for  us  most  important  of
ll,  to  deposit  ‘insurance’’’  (1939:987).  The  Schumpeterian
pproach  on  economic  development  offers  a  comprehen-
ive  analysis  which  points  to  the  consistency  of  voluntary
nd  system-wide  regulation  of  capitalist  economy  in  the
im  of  tackling  its  endogenous  disequilibria:  ‘‘no  social  sys-
em  can  work  which  is  based  exclusively  upon  a  network  of
ree  contracts  between  (legally)  equal  contracting  parties
nd  in  which  everyone  is  supposed  to  be  guided  by  nothing
xcept  his  own  (short-run)  utilitarian  ends’’  (The  March  into
ocialism,  in  1947:424).
. Concluding remarks
ore  than  one  hundred  years  after  the  ﬁrst  edition  of
he  Theory  of  Economic  Development, Schumpeter  is  still
tanding  as  the  Prophet  of  Innovations,  the  most  known
orerunner  of  the  dynamic  analysis  of  capitalist  economy.
hrough  entrepreneurs’  innovations  the  creative  destruction
BF.  Ülgen
omes  into  the  picture  and  points  to  the  key  ‘‘mechanics’’
f  economic  development.  Yet,  an  important  part  of  the
chumpeterian  framework  relies  on  the  analysis  of  the
redit  system  and  banks  that  ﬁnance  innovations  and
hen  economic  development.  In  an  institutionalist  setting
chumpeterian  economics  offers  a  relevant  endogenous-
oney-economy  schema  since  bank-credit-ﬁnancing  of
ntrepreneurial  activities  is  considered  as  the  keystone  of
apitalist  dynamics.
However,  unlike  his  creative  destruction  analysis  resting
n  entrepreneurial  innovations-based  incessant  economic
hange,  Schumpeter  (and  modern  Schumpeterian  works  --
ee,  for  instance,  Hanusch  and  Pyka,  2007)  did  not  develop
n  integrated  analysis  of  ﬁnancial  dynamics  to  appre-
end  the  possible  consequences  of  ﬁnancial  innovations
or  economic  development.  Unfortunately,  most  modern
conomists  frequently  use  the  real-sector-based  Schum-
eterian  evolutionary  framework  to  put  to  the  fore  the
o-called  positive  effects  of  ﬁnancial  markets  liberaliza-
ion  and  its  subsequent  ﬁnancial  innovations  on  economic
rowth.  But,  contrary  to  the  assumption  that  deregulated
nancial  markets  would  lead  to  further  innovations  and  then
o  efﬁcient  ﬁnancing  conditions  of  economic  activities,  this
rticle  sought  to  shed  light  on  the  very  nature  of  ﬁnancial
nnovations  of  the  (neo)liberal  era  and  on  the  links  between
nancial  innovations  and  ﬁnancial  instability.
Developing  a  monetary  reading  of  the  Schumpeterian
nalysis  we  argued  that  ﬁnancial  innovations  and  compe-
ition  were  not  able  to  spontaneously  improve  economic
evelopment.  Such  a  statement  rests  on  Hyman  Min-
ky’s  analysis  of  ﬁnancial  instability  hypothesis.  Minsky,
ho  was  a  PhD  student  of  Schumpeter,  aimed  at  show-
ng  in  his  work  that  ﬁnancial  innovations  often  provoke
 destructive  creation  path  in  a  liberalized  environment.
his  result  is  consistent  with  the  analytical  heritage  of
chumpeter.  Economic  development  needs  ﬁnancial  sta-
ility,  a  condition  that  cannot  be  reached  through  the
eckless/speculative  ﬁnance.  To  direct  banks’  and  ﬁnancial
ntermediaries’  strategies  to  ﬁnance  long-term  productive
nvestments  and  given  the  inability  of  capitalism  to  police
tself,  consistent  macro-regulatory  schemes  have  to  be
eveloped.
The  ongoing  worldwide  crisis  might  give  economists
nd  policy  makers  a  valuable  opportunity  to  go  back  over
heir  wrong  doctrinal  belief  and  to  redesign  more  relevant
nalytical  schemas  to  be  implemented  according  to  some
etter-organized  and  coordinated  social  welfare  objectives.
aybe,  from  the  crisis  could  be  born  new  positive  perspec-
ives  such  as  the  transition  from  Chaos  to  Gaia  and  from  Gaia
o  Eros?
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